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Abstract
Intermediaries and wholesalers play an important role in international trade. This paper
develops a model of international trade with heterogenous ￿rms that o⁄ers an explanation
of the existance of wholesalers. All exporting ￿rms have to pay a ￿xed cost of establishing
a distribution network in the foreign market. However, wholesalers possess a technology
di⁄erent to normal manufacturing ￿rms: they can buy manufacturing goods domestically
and sell in foreign markets and handle more than one good. A wholesaler therefore faces an
additional ￿xed cost which is convex and monotonically increasing in the number of goods it
ships. The entry of wholesale ￿rms leads to productivity sorting. The most productive ￿rms
export on their own, as in the standard model, by paying a ￿xed cost to do so, while the least
productive ￿rms do not export. However, a range of ￿rms with intermediate productivity
levels export through international wholesalers. The existance of wholesale ￿rms increase
total exports and the number of ￿rms that export. Moreover, a higher ￿xed cost of exporting
leads to (i) a higher share of exported goods that is distributed by wholesalers, and (ii) a
higher share of total exports that is distributed by wholesalers. The higher the ￿xed cost
of exporting, the more important is the role of wholesalers since these can spread the ￿xed
cost across more than one good. The wholesale technology therefore exhibits economies of
scope. Finally, a larger ￿xed cost of exporting increases the scope of each wholesaler ￿rm.
Empirical evidence from Swedish ￿rms￿export patterns supports the main predictions of
the model.
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11 Introduction
Recent empirical evidence attributes an important role of wholesalers and intermediaries in
international trade. Blum, Claro, and Horstmann (2009a) report that around 35% of imports
into Chile are done through wholesalers. Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009) ￿nd that
US trading ￿rms exhibit substantial heterogeneity as regards export mode (either ￿rms manage
their own exporting activity or export through wholesalers). The literature highlights the fact
that the common assumption of ￿rms always being responsible for their own exporting activities
does not provide a full picture of ￿rm behaviour in international trade.1 Consequently, a growing
theoretical literature is currently exploring the issue of intermediation in international trade.
This has mainly focused on either matching frictions between buyers and sellers, see Antras
and Costinot (2009) or Blum, Claro, and Horstmann (2009b), or on the presence of networks
in international trade, see Rauch and Watson (2004) or Petropoulou (2007).2
This paper tells a rather di⁄erent story about why wholesalers exist in international trade.
Here, wholesalers are vehicles that are able to pool the ￿xed cost of exporting across more
than one good. I utilise a standard model of international trade with ￿rm heterogeneity and
introduce a sector of wholesalers that do not produce themselves but instead buy goods in their
local market and export these goods to foreign markets. They only have to incur the ￿xed cost
of establishing a ￿beachhead￿ in a foreign market once (regardless of how many goods they
export), but face a convexly increasing ￿xed cost in expanding the set of goods they handle:
the ￿xed cost of their distribution network increases in the range of goods that they export.
Wholesalers are assumed to be homogenous in the model since I am mostly interested in how
aggregate trade ￿ ows and producers of goods respond to the possibility of exporting through
wholesalers rather than managing their own distribution networks.
The paper de￿nes the general equilibrium of a small economy that faces a ￿xed demand from
the ￿rest of the world￿ , a large foreign economy to which ￿rms can export. The model generates
a number of predictions to how exporting is conducted in the presence of intermediation. First,
producers sort according to productivity in determining their mode of exporting. The most
productive ￿rms continue to handle their own exporting atcivities and incur the ￿xed cost
associated with this as in the standard model. However, some ￿rms that were almost productive
enough to export on their own in a standard model now choose to do so but through wholesalers
instead. The least productive ￿rms do not export through any of the two modes. Second, the size
of the foreign market does not matter, instead the size of the ￿xed cost of exporting drives the
dynamics with regard to export mode. A higher ￿xed cost is associated with a larger importance
of wholesalers: a larger share of aggregate exports are now intermediated rather than exported
1For further empirical evidence, see also Basker and Van (2008a) and Basker and Van (2008b).
2Regarding the previous literature, Petropoulou (2007) contains some elements similar to mine but focus
rather on explaining the existance of intermediaries through matching frictions. The paper contains convex costs
to expanding a network which my model also has, but operates in an environment of homogenous ￿rms. The
mechanisms in that paper compared to the model presented here are therefore di⁄erent.
2directly by the producing ￿rm. Moreover, a larger number of ￿rms choose to export through
wholesalers rather than managing their own distribution systems when ￿xed costs of exporting
are high. Finally, a larger ￿xed cost is associated with each wholesaler handling more goods
(having a larger scope).
The core mechanism at work in the model is the following: Wholesalers manage to spread
the ￿xed cost of exporting across more than one good, but to cover the ￿xed cost, they need
to charge a markup between the procurement price of the good and what it charges the ￿nal
consumer in the foreign country. This markup that wholesalers charge causes productivity
sorting as regards export mode: the most productive ￿rms choose to incur their own ￿xed cost
of exporting since their operating pro￿t is large enough. However, some goods, which cannot
be pro￿tably exported by the producer itself, can be exported at a lower ￿xed cost per good
by wholesalers since these export several goods but only have to make one investment in the
￿xed cost. This means that the wholesale technology exhibits economies of scope. When ￿xed
costs are larger, wholesalers become more important since less ￿rms can export on their own.
Moreover, wholesalers have to expand and handle more goods to be able to cover the larger
￿xed cost.
The paper uses Swedish ￿rm level data from 2005 which matches customs data with ￿rms.
It is therefore possible to see a ￿rm￿ s sector classi￿cation and its trade ￿ ows by SITC5 product
code and destination. It can therefore be observed what goods are exported by ￿rms listed as
￿wholesalers￿and ￿manufacturers￿where the latter are treated as the producers of goods. The
analysis supports the main predictions of the model. Wholesalers export, on average, less of a
good than producers. Moreover, wholesalers are more important in the exporting patterns to
markets with high ￿xed costs.
Section 2 develops the model and derives the main results. Section 3 provides an empirical
analysis. Section 4 discusses the results in light of other empirical evidence available in the
literature and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The basic model builds on the structure in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) , which adds a
sector with constant returns to Melitz (2003).
2.1 Basics
The model depicts a small economy (￿Home￿ ) with a primary production factor labour, L,
which is used in all sectors. It faces a constant demand from the rest of the world (here
denoted as ￿Foreign￿ ). The A-sector (agriculture) is a Walrasian, homogenous-goods sector
with costless trade. The M-sector (manufactures) is characterized by increasing returns, Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition and iceberg trade costs. M-sector ￿rms face constant marginal
production costs and three types of ￿xed costs. The ￿rst ￿xed cost, FE, is the standard Dixit-
3Stiglitz cost of developing a new variety. The second and third ￿xed costs are ￿beachhead￿
costs re￿ ecting the one-time expense of introducing a new variety into a market.
There is heterogeneity with respect to ￿rms￿productivity, ’. Each Dixit-Stiglitz ￿rm/variety
is therefore associated with a particular labour output coe¢ cient ￿denoted as ’i for ￿rm i.
After sinking FE units of labour in the product innovation process, the ￿rm is randomly assigned
an ￿’i￿from a probability distribution G(’).
The analysis exclusively focuses on steady-state equilibria and intertemporal discounting is
ignored; the present value of ￿rms is kept ￿nite by assuming that ￿rms face a constant Poisson
hazard rate ￿ of forced exit.
Consumers in each nation have two-tier utility functions with the upper tier (Cobb-Douglas)
determining the consumer￿ s division of expenditure among the sectors and the second tier (CES)
dictating the consumer￿ s preferences over the various di⁄erentiated varieties within the M-sector.






where ￿ 2 (0;1), and CA is the consumption of the homogenous good. Manufactures enter the













N being the mass of varieties consumed, ci the amount of variety i consumed and ￿ > 1 the
elasticity of substitution.

















index of manufacturing goods.
The unit factor requirement of the homogeneous good is one unit of labour. This good is
freely traded and since it is chosen as the numeraire
pA = w = 1; (4)
w being the nominal wage of workers.
Neglecting the role of wholesalers for the moment, shipping the manufactured good involves
a frictional trade cost of the ￿iceberg￿form: for one unit of a good from Home to arrive in the
Foreign country (denoted by ￿F￿ ), ￿ > 1 units must be shipped. It is assumed that trade costs
are equal in both directions. Pro￿t maximisation by a manufacturing ￿rm i located in Home







Manufacturing ￿rms draw their marginal productivity, ’, from the probability distribution
G(’) after having sunk FE units of labour to develop a new variety. Having learned their
productivity, ￿rms decide on entry in the domestic and foreign market, respectively. Firms will
enter a market as long as the operating pro￿t in this market is su¢ ciently large to cover the
beachhead (market entry) cost associated with the market. Because of the constant mark-up
pricing, it is easily shown that operating pro￿ts equal sales divided by ￿. The critical ￿cut-o⁄￿
levels of the marginal costs (for the operating pro￿t to be as large as the discounted ￿xed cost
of entry) are given by:
’￿￿1
D B = FD, (6)
’￿￿1




















and FD ￿ ￿￿
￿
FD, FX ￿ ￿￿
￿
FX, and ￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿ 2 [0;1] represents trade freeness. B and BF are
the ￿per ￿rm￿demand of the Home market and the Foreign market, respectively. The small
economy assumption ￿xes the size of BF as well as the mass of Foreign manufacturing ￿rms
catering to the Home market, M
M;F
X at the average price PF
X.
Lemma 1: In a world without wholesalers, only ￿rms with a marginal productivity above
’X choose to export, ￿rms with a productivity between ’D and ’X serve the domestic market
and ￿rms with a marginal productivity below ’D exit immediately.
2.2 Introducing wholesalers
2.2.1 Assumptions
The third sector, which is the novel feature of my model, is the wholesale sector (denoted by
￿W￿ ). The wholesale technology gives a wholesaler ￿rm j the ability to source a range of goods
(￿nW
j ￿ ) and ship these to the Foreign country. The sector is homogenous with free entry and
￿rms are indexed by ￿j￿ . A wholesaler faces the same cost as manufacturing ￿rms to establish
a retail channel in the foreign country, FX, but has the technology to export several goods.
5Since operations become more costly the more goods a ￿rm handles, it also faces a per-period








where ￿ > 1 and nW
j is the number of domestic manufacturing goods the wholesale ￿rm j is
handling. Its total ￿xed cost is therefore FX + sW
j .
The marginal cost of the wholesaler is, ￿rst, the iceberg trade cost, ￿, and, second, the
procurement price of the domestic manufacturing good. It can be shown that the price that the
wholesaler pays the manufacturing ￿rm for its product is simply pi, which is a constant markup
over the marginal cost of the manufacturing ￿rm (the same cost that producers charge local
consumers in the Home country). This is also the result of the fact that producers that sell
in the Home country cannot discriminate between ￿nal consumers and wholesalers. The total







The wholesaler is assumed to get the exclusive right to sell the manufacturing good in the
foreign market (thereby excluding the possibility that more than one wholesaler sell the same
manufacturing good) and faces the demand BFp￿￿
ij where pij is the price that wholesale ￿rm j
charges for manufacturing good i. It will therefore charge the standard CES markup over its













Note that it can be shown that a wholesaler will always charge a CES markup of ￿
￿￿1
to the price that the manufacturing ￿rm charges. Moreover, it can also be shown that the
manufacturing ￿rm will charge the wholesale ￿rm exactly the same price as it charges domestic
consumers. Therefore, it will always use the same price: ￿
￿￿1’￿1
i . A manufacturing ￿rm i that








at its standard price ￿
￿￿1’￿1
i . Its
















6Figure 1: Relative pro￿ts for di⁄erent export modes. ￿X indicates the operating pro￿t of
a producer which exports on its own and ￿W indicates the operating pro￿t of a producer















meaning that a manufacturing ￿rm would always prefer to export on its own than through a
wholesaler, if it only can cover its ￿xed costs. This is illustrated in ￿gure 1.
Lemma 2 As long as a manufacturing ￿rm￿ s operating pro￿ts from exporting cover its ￿xed
cost of exporting, it will always prefer to export on its own to exporting through a wholesaler.
This is due to the markup that a wholesaler charges in the foreign country. Export sales per
good are lower for wholesalers than for producers exporting on their own.
Proposition 1 The model generates productivity sorting. The most productive ￿rms, ’ >
’X, export their products on their own, the second most productive ￿rms, ’ 2 [’W;’X), export
through wholesalers and the least productive ￿rms, ’ 2 [’D;’W), do not export. That ’D < ’W
has, however, to be assumed (shown later in the paper).
The ￿xed cost of a wholesaler is
TCj = FX + sW






Wholesale ￿rms are homogeneous and I assume that the atomistic manufacturing ￿rms that
use wholesalers for the distribution of their goods are ￿randomly￿matched with wholesaler ￿rms
7Figure 2: Productivity sorting and export mode.
(see ￿gure 2). This ensures that wholesaler ￿rms in equilibrium will have identical ￿baskets￿of
goods that they export. They will have the same range and distribution of productivity among
the goods in their baskets. The total number of goods that a wholesaler ￿rm then handles
will be equal to the number of manufacturing ￿rms with a productivity between ’W and ’X
(MM G(’X)￿G(’W)
1￿G(aD) ) where MM is the mass of manufacturing ￿rms, divided by the total mass








The ￿xed cost can therefore be written:















where ’W is the marginal productivity of the least productive manufacturing ￿rm that sells
to wholesalers.
Since wholesale ￿rms are homogeneous and manufacturing ￿rms atomistic (in￿nitely small
distributed along the G(’) distribution), it can be assumed that a wholesaler handles goods
from the range between ’W and ’X and that the number of goods it handles is simply this
range divided by the total number of wholesale ￿rms, MW. It implictly assumes that wholesalers
divide the market into equal shares.
Another point is that, as can be shown, the sourcing of wholesalers from manufacturing
￿rms does not change the pricing behaviour of the manufacturing ￿rms. Since the wholesaler
8charges a constant markup over the price of the domestic ￿rms￿ s prices, the manufacturing ￿rms
still face a demand schedule with an elasticity of ￿. Manufacturing ￿rms will therefore continue
to charge a price with a constant markup over their marginal cost.
2.2.2 Solving the model with wholesalers
A wholesaler takes as given the number of other wholesale ￿rms and the number of domestic
manufacturing ￿rms. Solving backwards, once the ￿xed cost is sunk, the pricing mechanism is as
described in (10), a constant markup over the marginal cost. Therefore the number of wholesale
￿rms and the range of goods they consume can be determined by two conditions. First, the free
entry condition states that the pro￿ts of wholesale ￿rms should be zero. Second, the marginal
increase in operating pro￿ts for a wholesaler ￿rm to expand its set of goods distributed must
equal the resulting marginal increase in ￿xed costs.
The operating pro￿ts of a wholesale ￿rm is
nW
j e ￿W
























j (’W;’X) is the average operating pro￿t per good handled given the range of pro-
ductivity in the basket.





























(Optimal number of goods distributed). (18)
These two conditions determine the number of goods handled (nW
j ) and the weighted average























We see that the ￿xed cost of exporting, FX, is the key variable to understand how the size
of wholesaler ￿rms is determined. A larger ￿xed cost of exporting forces wholesaler ￿rms to
expand their scope so that the ￿xed cost is spread across more goods. The operating pro￿t per
good handled must also be larger in equilibrium for wholesaler ￿rms. The variable determining
how di¢ cult it is for wholesalers to handle more goods, ￿, also plays a role. The more di¢ cult
it is to handle many goods, the greater the e⁄ect of the ￿xed costs on size and average operating
pro￿t.
9Proposition 2 The scope of wholesalers increases in the size of the ￿xed cost of exporting.



















where ’W is the equilibrium level of the lowest productivity needed for a manufacturing ￿rm
to use a wholesaler ￿rm to export. The small economy assumption means that BF is ￿xed and
the export cuto⁄, ’X, is determined according to (7) by only BF, ￿ and FX, which are all
exogenous variables (note that ’X increases in the ￿xed cost of exporting and decreases in the
foreign market size, ￿BF). This means that quation (21) yields an implicit and unique solution
for ’W.
Using the equilibrium value ’￿
W, it is also possible to ￿nd a solution for the number of ￿rms

















Finally, the free entry condition for manufacturing ￿rms says that, in expectation, the























The structure described above yields a general equilibrium for the small economy Home.
Proposition 3 The set of equations (6), (7), (8), (21), (22) and (23) yield solutions for the
productivity cuto⁄s ’D, ’W, ’X, the mass of wholesale and manufacturing ￿rms, MW, MM
and the ￿per ￿rm￿demand B.
Proposition 3 characterises the general equilibrium of the small Home economy.
2.3 Imposing the Pareto distribution
The equilibrium described in Proposition 2 is somewhat di¢ cult to analyse without any further
assumptions about the distribution of productivity, G(’). I therefore impose the scale-free
Pareto distribution to yield solutions that are easier to interpret. The scale-free property of
the Pareto distribution make general conclusions easier since the exact levels of productivity
do not matter as much as relative levels. Moreover, the Pareto distribution has been found to
correspond reasonably well with the real distribution of ￿rm productivity, see Axtell (2001) or
Luttmer (2007). Now:






￿￿1 ￿ ￿ > 1 and ’ 2 [b;1).
To calculate the relative export volumes that occur by ￿rms exporting on their own versus
through wholesalers, it can be noted that the export volume of a good through the two export
modes is:




















which is a direct function of the relative productivity cuto⁄s ’X and ’W.









which is also a direct function of the relative productivity cuto⁄s.


























First, it is interesting to note that neither the variable trade cost, ￿, or per ￿rm demand,
BF, play any role for the export mode. This is due to the fact that for the operating pro￿t, these
variables a⁄ect wholesalers and direct exporters in identical ways. Second, a higher ￿xed cost
causes the productivity cuto⁄ for exporting to increase.3 This, therefore, causes: (i) more ￿rms
to export through wholesalers and (ii) the relative export volume that is managed by wholesalers
to increase. This result originates in the central dynamic provided by the model: the wholesale
industry pools the export ￿xed costs across goods and can therefore make the ￿xed cost per








> 0 if x > 1 and a > b > 0.




a ￿ b ￿ ax
￿b
￿
+ b > 0.
Now, consider the ￿rst two terms of the ￿rst product. x
a is minimised when x = 1 and a￿b￿ax
￿b is minimised
when x = 1 (recall that x > 1). When x = 1, the expression on the left hand side is equal to 0. However, as
x increases, both x
a and a ￿ b ￿ ax
￿b increases, meaning that the whole expression on the left hand side will
increase. Therefore, the condition holds since x has to be strictly greater than 1. ￿
11good to be lower. We saw previously that a higher ￿xed cost also causes wholesale ￿rms to
expand the set of goods that they handle. By doing so, the ￿xed cost per good decreases.
Proposition 4 A higher ￿xed cost is associated with (i) a higher share of total exports that
go through wholesalers and (ii) a larger number of ￿rms exporting through wholesalers relative
to exporting themselves. This is due to the fact that wholesalers spread the ￿xed cost of exporting
across more goods.
The wholesaler technology therefore exhibit an increasing returns to scale property with
regard to product scope. At low enough numbers of goods handled, an increase in the product
scope lower the ￿xed cost per good, making wholesalers more important as ￿xed costs increase.
3 Empirical evidence
3.1 Main predictions
The model yields four main falsi￿able hypotheses that this section aims to evaluate empirically:
1. Export sales per good are lower for wholesalers than for producers exporting on their own
(Lemma 2).
2. A larger share of aggregate export volumes is handled by wholesalers to countries with
high ￿xed costs of entry (Proposition 4).
3. A larger share of the number of exported goods is handled by wholesalers to countries with
high ￿xed costs of entry (Proposition 4).
4. Wholesalers export a wider scope of goods to countries wih high ￿xed costs of entry
(Proposition 2).
In this section, the number of goods and number of products per ￿rm or destination mean the
same thing: the number of (SITC5) categories of goods that are exported. The ￿rst prediction
originates from the fact that goods sold abroad through wholesalers are produced in a less
productive way than other export goods and the fact that wholesalers charge an additional
markup. The last three predictions, however, are all related to the core mechanism highlighted
in the theoretical section. When ￿xed costs increase, wholesalers￿ability to generate economies
of scope by spreading the ￿xed cost of entry across more goods becomes more valuable. Variation
in all variables listed is therefore driven by the variation in ￿xed costs. Measures of ￿xed costs
of entry are always imperfect. The analysis will, however, try to do this in two ways: (i) by
viewing market size as a measure of ￿xed costs, and (ii) backing out a proxy for ￿xed costs from a
gravity model. The next paragraphs outline the theoretical underpinnings of this methodology.
3.2 Data
The data on trade will be based on Swedish ￿rm data from the year of 2005 (the most recent
year for which such data is available). A ￿rm in this dataset is classi￿ed according to its main
12activity and the analysis will utilise ￿rms that are listed as ￿wholesalers￿ 4 and ￿rms active in any
of the manufacturing sectors. From now on, producers exporting on their own will sometimes
be referred to as ￿manufacturers￿since ￿rms that are listed as exporting manufacturers (and
not listed as wholesalers) can be assumed to export on their own. Only exporting ￿rms5 are
used and in 2005 there were 8353 wholesaler ￿rms exporting and 8512 manufacturing ￿rms. The
￿rm level data is from the Swedish ￿rm database called ￿F￿retagsdatabasen￿and is collected
by Statistics Sweden. The trade data is from Customs Sweden and records all trade ￿ ows per
￿rm, SITC5 product code and destination country. Only manufacturing SITC5 categories are
included in the analysis. For 2005, there are in total 483,809 transactions reported over 2620
SITC5 categories and 194 destination countries.
The average number of product categories that a ￿rm exported was 8.2 for wholesalers
and 7.2 for manufacturers. However, manufacturers are much larger and account for 85% of
aggregate export volumes (measured in Swedish currency).
As for market size and the institutional variable used, all data comes from the World Bank￿ s
World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Distance measures are from Centre D￿ Etudes
Prospectives et D￿ Informations Internationales (CEPII).
3.3 Prediction 1
This part examines whether sales per good are lower for wholesalers than manufacturers. The
theoretical motivation for this is that wholesalers handle goods that are produced with lower
productivity than manufacturers and are therefore more expensive. Moreover, wholesalers need
to charge an extra markup which exporting manufacturers do not.
As noted, manufacturers account for 85% of aggregate exports which gives an indication
that this prediction holds. However, to account for e⁄ects that are speci￿c for products and
destination countries, a regression analysis using ￿xed e⁄ects for these variables is applied.
The regression equation that is used will be:
xijl = ￿ + ￿Wj (25)
where xijl is the logarithm of the exports of product i by ￿rm j to country l. Wj is takes the
value 1 if the product is sold by a wholesale ￿rm and 0 if it is sold by a manufacturer. Fixed
e⁄ects for product and destination countries are included. The coe¢ cient ￿ therefore measures
the di⁄erence in export levels per good between wholesalers and manufacturers. To account
for characteristics of speci￿c product categories and speci￿c markets, ￿xed e⁄ects are included
for product codes and destinations. Otherwise, if wholesalers export within di⁄erent categories
4Both ￿wholesalers￿ and ￿retailers￿ will be called ￿wholesalers￿ in the analysis since their activities are
probably very similar for the purposes of this paper. The results are, however, robust to using only pure
￿wholesalers￿ .
5Firms with no employees are excluded.
13(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wholesale dummy -0.721*** -0.460*** -0.815*** -0.577***
(0.00841) (0.00850) (0.00889) (0.00944)
Constant 10.35*** 10.24*** 10.39*** 10.29***
(0.00542) (0.00516) (0.00552) (0.00538)
Fixed effects
Product NO YES NO YES
Destination NO NO YES YES
Categories 1 2620 194 81309
Observations 483809 483809 483809 483809
R-squared 0.015 0.192 0.034 0.350
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log(export)
Table 2
than manufacturers, or serve di⁄erent markets, the coe¢ cient might be biased. Table 2 lists
the result.
The regressions indicate that wholesalers, on average, sell between 40% or 80% less of a
given product to a given country. The negative e⁄ect is signi￿cant at the 1% level for all four
combinations of ￿xed e⁄ects. It therefore seems as if Prediction 1 holds in the data, wholesalers
sell less per good than producers. The e⁄ect of including ￿xed e⁄ects is of some magnitude
(which means that there is some selection) but not of a very large nature since the results are
qualitatively similar.
3.4 Predictions 2 to 4
3.4.1 Market size as a proxy for ￿xed costs
Regarding predictions 2 to 4, the explanatory variable is the ￿xed cost of entry in all cases.
Therefore, these predictions will be examined in the same context in the following text. The
theory states that a higher ￿xed cost increases the importance of the wholesalers￿ability of
generating economies of scope. Wholesalers are able to spread the ￿xed cost across several
products and are therefore better equipped to export to markets where the ￿xed cost is high.
The main variable for proxying ￿xed costs will be market size measured by the gross domestic
product. Why is this measure correlated with ￿xed costs? Put simply, it is rather intuitive
that the investments required to build a distribution network must be larger in a large country
than a small country. The larger the population a ￿rm wants to reach, the more warehouses or
the larger warehouses it would want to build in order to cover the whole population. However,
a similar story has recently been formalised and empirically tested by Arkolakis (2009). The
14paper provides a microeconomic foundation for a situation where ￿rms endogenously determine
how much they invest in the ￿xed cost. In the model, a marginal unit of investment raises the
number of consumers reached by the ￿rm, or the penetration of the market. At the margin,
the cost of reaching an additional consumer is lower if there is (i) a large population (since, for
example, advertising is more e⁄ective if a market is dense) or (ii) the ￿rm￿ s investment level
is low (the advertising technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale). The result is that, on
average, ￿rms will invest more in the ￿xed cost to enter larger countries since the returns to
advertising spending is larger there.
For the model presented in this paper, this reasoning would be that market size is associated
with (i) a higher ￿xed cost (FX) and (ii) a larger demand per ￿rm (BF). The fact that both
variables vary with country size would be problematic if it were not for the fact that the model
predicts that BF has no impact on the relative levels of wholesaler versus producer sales. Only
the ￿xed cost matters and the results in Arkolakis (2009) can therefore be applied in this context
to use market size as a proxy for ￿xed costs.
This assumption is also supported by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2005) who ￿nd a
strong positive relationship between country size and entry cost when calibrating their model6
to French ￿rms.
The analysis will employ a cross-country analysis rather than a panel data approach with
country ￿xed e⁄ects. The reason for this is that the variation attained when comparing countries
is likely to be much more informative for this study than the variation from these variable
changing within countries over time. This is because entry and exit patterns of ￿rms take time
to reach steady state values and a ￿xed e⁄ect approach will therefore yield results not so much
linked to a theory based on general equilibrium analysis but rather the complexities of ￿rm
entry and exit which is not the objective of this study.
The analysis, in this section, will therefore focus on market size as a proxy for the equilibrium
￿xed cost of entry. The variables that the model focuses on are (i) the share of aggregate exports
(in value) exported by wholesalers, (ii) the share of the total number of products that are
exported by wholesalers and (iii) the number of products that are shipped by each wholesaler.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the three variables across the markets to which Swedish
￿rms exported in 2005. The share of total exports is calculated by summing the value of all
exports to a speci￿c market and then calculating how much of this value was exported by ￿rms
listed as wholesalers. The graph shows that, to most markets, the share is rather small, about
10%, but not for all. To some, but very few markets, the share of wholesalers is above 50%. The
second graph shows what share of goods that are exported to a speci￿c market that is exported
by wholesalers. Since some products are, of course, exported by both wholesalers and producers
(each SITC5 product code is an aggregate and therefore includes multiple products within it),
the variable listed here is how many products wholesalers export divided by the number of
6Their model is, of course, di⁄erent to the present one but they still ￿nd a strong positive relationship between













0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1













0 .2 .4 .6 .8















0 5 10 15 20
Scope per market
Figure 3: The role of wholesalers in exporting.
products manufacturers export plus how many products wholesalers export.7 The relationship
is similar to the previous one, although the distribution lies slightly more to the right. This
means that to most countries, most products are exported only by the producers. Finally,
the third graph describes the scope of wholesalers, the distribution of how many products
wholesalers export per market. In most markets, wholesalers export only a few products (less
than ￿ve), but in some markets more than that.
The empirical methodology will be to, ￿rst, plot the relationship between market size and
the relevant variables and then, second, examine the relationship in a regression framework.
Figure 4 shows the plots of the three variables versus market size. Some, albeit weak,
positive relationships can be observed. A regression analysis is therefore applied as well. The
following estimation equation is used:
Xi = ￿ + ￿1GDPi + "i (26)
where GDPi is the GDP level of the destination country.
Table 3 reports the regression results. All variables are signi￿cantly and positively related
to GDP in the destination country. That means that wholesalers are more important for
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GDP 0.166*** 0.0869*** 0.0848***
(0.0526) (0.0273) (0.0238)
Observations 159 159 159
R-squared 0.060 0.061 0.075
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3
17exports to large markets. They control a larger share of total exports and they control a larger
range of the product scope that is exported. Moreover, they export a wider range of goods in
larger markets. If the assumption that ￿xed costs are larger in larger markets holds, as was
argued above, Swedish exporting patterns follow the predictions of the model to the extent that
wholesalers are more important in exporting to markets characterised by larger ￿xed costs.
3.4.2 Backing out ￿xed costs from observed export patterns
If the assumption that market size is a good proxy for ￿xed costs would not hold, an alternative
method would be to use observed export patterns and back out measures of ￿xed costs. This
method is based on the recent literature on how ￿rm heterogeneity impacts the gravity model.
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) show that ￿rm heterogeneity a⁄ects the selection of
￿rms and that this has strong impacts on the gravity model, mostly by the presence of trade
￿ ows with zero values which were previously ignored. I follow, to some extent, this methodology
by using the gravity equation for manufacturing ￿rms (producers) and use the residual from a
gravity regression as a proxy inversely related to ￿xed costs of exporting. The gravity model
controls for market size (in the form of GDP and GDP per capita) and variable trade costs
(here distance and a measure of institutional quality). What remains can then be argued to
be inversely related to the ￿xed cost and can be used to test the predictions for the aggregate
variables in predictions 2 to 4.
The methodology here will therefore be to, ￿rst, use the gravity model to control for market
demand and variable costs of exporting as well as a measure of institutional quality: the World
Bank￿ s ￿ease of doing business￿ranking system which orders countries according to the quality
of business environment (where the ￿rst country has the best business environment).8 The
regression equation is:
Xi = ￿ + ￿1GDPi + ￿2distanceSWE;i + ￿3POPi + ￿4EODBi + "i (27)
where, again, GDPi is the gross domestic product of market i, distanceSWE;i is the distance
from Sweden, POPi is the population and EODBi is the proxy for institutional quality. The
dependant variable, Xi, will be used with two cases. First, the measure will be total exports
to each country by manufacturing ￿rms (not wholesalers) and, second, it will be the number
of (SITC5) products that are exported to each country by manufacturing ￿rms. The reason
only manufacturers are included is that equation (7) means that both of these variables (for
manufacturers) will increase in market size but decrease in the ￿xed and variable costs. Note
also that by including both GDP and population I implicitly control for GDP per capita. In this
way, I control for items that a⁄ect the export behaviour through market size and variable trade
costs. This leaves a vector of residuals, b "i, which will be interpreted as an implicit measure of
8The World Bank does not report this ranking for the year of 2005, so instead I take the value from 2008
which is the only year for which this is available. The motivation for doing so is the strong probability that this
variables are fairly stable over time across countries.
18(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
GDP 1.076*** 0.942*** 0.849*** 0.701***
(0.0571) (0.0803) (0.0428) (0.0571)
Distance -0.819*** -0.797*** -0.656*** -0.638***
(0.110) (0.106) (0.0821) (0.0756)
Population 0.0302 0.150* -0.144*** -0.0203
(0.0622) (0.0846) (0.0465) (0.0602)
Ease of doing business -0.00597** -0.00673***
(0.00240) (0.00171)
Observations 174 168 174 168
R-squared 0.872 0.886 0.860 0.887
Standard errors in parentheses.







the ￿xed cost (a higher b "i means a lower ￿xed cost). This is due to the fact that they are the
residuals of a regression where both market size (as GDP or GDP per capita) as well as the
variable cost (as distance and a measure institutional quality) have been controlled for. What
is left could be interpreted as something correlated with the ￿xed cost of entry; it is backed out
by controlling for other observable variables that a⁄ect the variables concerned.
Table 4 reports the results from this ￿￿rst stage￿regression. The coe¢ cients support the
standard predictions of the gravity model for a setting with heterogeneous ￿rms.
The measure b "i can then be used in a regression where these three key predictions of the
model are tested (predictions 2 to 4):
Xi = ￿ + ￿1b "i + ￿2GDPi + ￿3distanceSWE;i + ￿4POPi + ￿5EODBi + vi. (28)
where Xi will be the three following variables: (i) the share of total exports, in values, that
are handled by wholesalers, (ii) the share of products that are sold by wholesalers and (iii) the
scope of wholesalers. Note that b "i is negatively correlated to the ￿xed cost so the model will
predict that all these variables should be negatively correlated with b "i. Table 5 reports the
results.
The results in Table 5 are mixed. When the aggregate export volume is used, predictions
2 and 3 are supported (part A in Table 5). When ￿xed costs are high (low residuals from the
￿rst stage regression) wholesalers account for a larger share of the aggregate export volume and
for a larger range of goods. Both of these variables have signi￿cant and negative coe¢ cients
with regard to to the residuals from the ￿rst stage regression when export volumes are used
19(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
VARIABLES
First stage variable: values of export volume
Residuals from first stage -0.564*** -0.626*** -0.105* -0.147** 0.0734 0.0315
(0.101) (0.111) (0.0533) (0.0585) (0.0447) (0.0493)
GDP 0.0642 0.136 0.0174 0.0145 0.0310 0.00608
(0.0668) (0.0978) (0.0351) (0.0516) (0.0295) (0.0435)
Distance -0.586*** -0.550*** -0.439*** -0.420*** -0.441*** -0.424***
(0.125) (0.126) (0.0657) (0.0667) (0.0551) (0.0562)
Population 0.0231 -0.0660 0.0343 0.0383 0.0241 0.0457
(0.0736) (0.105) (0.0387) (0.0556) (0.0325) (0.0469)
Ease of doing business 0.00229 -0.000219 -0.00111
(0.00296) (0.00156) (0.00131)
Observations 159 153 159 153 159 153
R-squared 0.309 0.315 0.291 0.300 0.356 0.352
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
VARIABLES
First stage variable: number of export goods
Residuals from first stage 0.0553 0.129 -0.166** -0.234*** 0.0592 -0.00153
(0.138) (0.158) (0.0656) (0.0747) (0.0558) (0.0638)
GDP 0.0904 0.143 0.0177 0.0194 0.0293 0.00565
(0.0731) (0.108) (0.0348) (0.0510) (0.0296) (0.0436)
Distance -0.611*** -0.581*** -0.439*** -0.419*** -0.439*** -0.423***
(0.137) (0.139) (0.0652) (0.0659) (0.0554) (0.0563)
Population 0.0300 -0.0252 0.0332 0.0309 0.0241 0.0440
(0.0806) (0.116) (0.0384) (0.0551) (0.0326) (0.0471)
Ease of doing business 0.00140 -4.10e-05 -0.00107
(0.00326) (0.00154) (0.00132)
Observations 159 153 159 153 159 153
R-squared 0.171 0.170 0.302 0.316 0.350 0.350
Standard errors in parentheses.
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20as the variable in the ￿rst stage. However, when the number of goods exported is used, the
relationships are less clear and only prediction 3 is supported: a larger range of goods are
exported by wholesalers in countries with high ￿xed costs. The other two variables do not have
signi￿cant coe¢ cients with regard to the residuals.
How should this be interpreted? It can be argued that export volume is a better variable to
use in this case. This is because when measuring the number of goods, many small ￿rms will
be included that we know only export very small amounts and enter and exit export markets
frequently. In this sense, aggregate export volumes are less susceptible to this type of noise
since they are, by construction, weighted averages that give more weight to larger ￿rms.
The analysis therefore concludes that by backing out a proxy of ￿xed costs which consists of
the residual from a gravity model that takes market size and variable trade costs into account,
there is some support for the model. Wholesalers are shown to be more important in markets
with larger ￿xed costs, or at least costs that the gravity model does not account for. Wholesalers
are more important in both the sense that they control a larger share of the aggregate value of
exports and a larger share of the type of goods that are exported.
4 Conclusion
The paper presents a model that gives a rationale for the presence of wholesalers and interme-
diaries in international trade. According to this explanation, wholesalers possess a technology
that allows them to use their international distribution network to handle more than one good
(although the ￿xed cost increases in the number of goods they handle), while the producers of
these goods (manufacturing ￿rms) can only export their own good. In order to cover the ￿xed
cost of exporting, wholesalers need to charge a markup between the price at which they procure
the good and the ￿nal price in the foreign country. This markup causes manufacturing ￿rms
to export on their own as long as they are productive enough to cover the ￿xed cost of doing
so. However, if they are not productive enough, they will try to sell their good to the foreign
market through a wholesaler￿ s distribution network. This process results in productivity sorting
as regards export mode: the most productive ￿rms export on their own while less productive
￿rms export through wholesalers. The least productive ￿rms do not export at all.
Regarding the total shares of exports that are shipped by producers of the goods versus
wholesalers￿ networks as well as the relative numbers of ￿rms, some interesting results are
found. Market size and variable ￿iceberg￿trade costs do not matter. Instead, the ￿xed cost of
exporting plays an important role: the higher the ￿xed cost of exporting, the more of exports
take place through wholesalers￿distribution networks. This is the case since wholesalers can
spread the ￿xed cost over several goods, as opposed to manufacturing ￿rms, which need to
incure one ￿xed cost for their single good. As ￿xed costs become more important, ￿rms shift
to export through wholesalers (which expand the number of goods they handle) such that they
can bene￿t from lower ￿xed costs per good exported.
The empirical section supports the main predictions of the model. First, it shows that
21wholesalers export smaller amounts of each product, even when the e⁄ect of which particular
sector it concerns or which country the good is exported to is controlled for. Second, wholesalers
export a larger share of export volumes and the product range to larger markets. The average
scope of wholesalers is also larger for exporting to larger markets. If market size (GDP) is
a good proxy for ￿xed costs, as have been found in the previous literature, this supports the
prediction that wholesalers are more important for destinations with larger ￿xed costs. Finally,
the paper attempts to back out the ￿xed cost of entering di⁄erent destination countries by
using the residual from a gravity model as a proxy. This analysis also supports the notion that
wholesalers play a larger role in exporting to countries characterised by larger ￿xed costs of
entry.
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